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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-1514 
___________ 
 
MANUEL WILLIAMS, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
DONNA ZICKEFOOSE 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey  
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-10-cv-04579) 
District Judge:  Honorable Noel L. Hillman 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 9, 2012 
 
Before:  SLOVITER, GREENAWAY, JR. and BARRY, Circuit 
 
Judges 
(Opinion filed: November 15, 2012) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Manuel Williams, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals from the District 
Court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  
For the following reasons, we will affirm. 
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I. 
In 2005, Williams was arrested and charged with Attempted Possession of a 
Controlled Substance in South Dakota state court.  On August 30, 2005, he received a 
forty-month state sentence, with credit given from the time he was taken into custody on 
February 2, 2005.  On October 13, 2005, he was indicted for six federal drug crimes in 
the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota.  Williams was received 
into federal custody pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum on November 
17, 2005.  On June 16, 2006, while in federal custody, he was paroled on his state 
sentence. 
Williams was sentenced on three counts of the federal indictment on December 4, 
2006.  He received a term of 121 months incarceration, followed by five years of 
supervised release.  Although Williams had already completed his state sentence, the 
sentencing court directed that his federal sentence should run concurrent with his state 
sentence. 
Williams was designated to FCI Fort Dix, New Jersey, on December 20, 2006.  
The Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) calculated Williams’ federal sentence as beginning on 
December 4, 2006, the date that it was imposed.  He was given prior custody credit from 
June 17, 2006, the date after his state sentence ended, through December 3, 2006, the date 
before his federal sentence began.  He has a projected good conduct time release date of 
March 31, 2015. 
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Williams disputes the BOP’s computation of his sentence.  He contends that his 
jail time credit should accrue from February 2, 2005, the date he was taken into state 
custody, instead of from June 17, 2006, the day after he completed his state sentence, 
because the state and federal offenses were essentially the same.  After unsuccessfully 
pursuing administrative relief from the BOP, Williams filed a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus challenging the BOP’s execution of his federal sentence.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2241; 
Coady v. Vaughn
II. 
, 251 F.3d 480, 485-86 (3d Cir. 2001). The District Court denied the 
petition, and Williams timely appealed.   
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253.  A certificate of 
appealability is not required to appeal from the denial of a § 2241 petition.  Burkey v. 
Marberry, 556 F.3d 142, 146 (3d Cir. 2009).  We review a District Court’s denial of 
habeas corpus relief de novo.  Vega v. United States
  Calculating a term of imprisonment is comprised of two steps.  First, “a sentence 
to a term of imprisonment commences on the date the defendant is received in custody 
awaiting transportation to . . . the official detention facility at which the sentence is to be 
served.”  18 U.S.C. § 3585(a).  Second, a defendant receives credit for time spent in 
custody “prior to the date the sentence commences . . . that has not been credited against 
another sentence.”  18 U.S.C. § 3585(b).  In other words, a federal prisoner can receive 
credit for certain time spent in official detention before his sentence begins, as long as 
that time has not been credited against any other sentence.  Section 3585(b) makes clear 
, 493 F.3d 310, 314 (3d Cir. 2007).     
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that prior custody credit cannot be double counted.  United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 
329, 337 (1992) (a defendant cannot “receive a double credit for his detention time”); see 
also Vega
 In this case, the BOP credited Williams’ federal sentence with the period between 
June 17, 2006, and December 3, 2006, for the time he served in official detention that 
was not credited toward his state sentence; that is, the time after he was paroled (at which 
point his state sentence was satisfied), until the day before his federal sentence began.  
The District Court determined that Williams’ “request to have the time before June 17, 
2006 credited against his remaining time is, in effect, a request for double credit of the 
state time that [he] served prior to federal sentence.”  (Dkt. No. 11, p. 7.)  Because § 
3585(b) prohibits double counting, the District Court denied Williams’ petition.   
, 493 F.3d at 314.   
 We agree with the District Court.  Williams’ time in custody from February 2, 
2005, until June 16, 2006, was credited to his state sentence, and could not apply to his 
federal sentence.1
                                              
1 A prisoner detained pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum remains in the 
primary custody of the first jurisdiction – in this case, the state of South Dakota – “unless 
and until the first sovereign relinquishes jurisdiction over the prisoner.”  Rios v. Wiley, 
201 F.3d 257, 274 (3d Cir. 2000).  South Dakota did not relinquish jurisdiction prior to 
Williams being paroled.   
  The fact that the sentencing court ordered that Williams’ federal 
sentence run concurrently with his state sentence does not change our analysis.  The 
sentencing court was apparently unaware that Williams’ state sentence was complete at 
time of his federal sentencing.  Moreover, as the District Court pointed out, it would have 
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been impossible for Williams to serve the sentences concurrently because his state 
sentence ended before his federal sentence began.  (Dkt. No. 11, p. 8.)   
  Williams’ argument that the sentencing court meant to apply U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(c), 
thereby making his “federal sentence retroactively concurrent for the entire period of the 
state sentence,” (Informal Br., p. 3a), is unavailing.  The record does not reflect that § 
5G1.3(c) was ever taken into consideration at any time during sentencing.  Williams’ 
reliance on Ruggiano v. Reish, 307 F.3d 121, 131 (3d Cir. 2002), is misplaced.  In that 
case, the defendant specifically requested the application of §5G1.3(c), id., while 
Williams did not.  Moreover, after our decision in Ruggiano, the application notes to § 
5G1.3(c) were amended specifically to avoid confusion with the BOP’s exclusive 
authority to grant credit for time served under § 3585(b).  See U.S.S.G. §5G1.3 app. note 
3(E) (2003).  The notes state that any downward departure pursuant to § 5G1.3(c) should 
be clearly stated on the record.  Id.
 We conclude that the BOP did not err in calculating Williams’ sentence.  The 
District Court properly denied his petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  We will, therefore, 
affirm the District Court’s order entered on January 6, 2012.   
  Because this amendment was in effect at the time 
Williams’ federal sentence was imposed, and neither he nor the sentencing court so much 
as mentioned § 5G1.3(c), we cannot accept Williams’ argument that the sentencing court 
meant to apply it.     
